Registration is now open for the 2026 Fraud and Consumer Protection Summit. Click here to register.
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Registration is now open for the 2026 Fraud and Consumer Protection Summit. Click here to register.
Registration is now open for the 2026 Fraud and Consumer Protection Summit. Click here to register.
Question 1: If a council member is asked to attend or speak at a civic event, Rotary Club, Kiwanis, etc., where other council members may be present and is asked to state an opinion on current or potential business before the governing body, is that a violation of A.C.A. § 25-19-106(g)? What if it is arranged as a debate between candidates for various council seats and current council members are asked to state and defend their opinion on items that are current or potential business to be voted on by city council? If the answers to the above questions are “yes,” those are potential violations of FOIA based upon the requirement that all business before the council be discussed in the public meeting; are there steps that could be taken to “cure” this potential violation in advance?
Brief Response: It is my opinion that, generally, a council member may speak at a civic event without violating the FOIA—even if another council member is present—provided that the speaker has no control over the event and addresses a broad public audience without directly exchanging information or opinions or discussing prohibited topics with another member of the governing body. But this is a highly factual question. If circumstances indicate that members of a governing body used a public event to evade or circumvent the FOIA, a court could find that such conduct violated the FOIA. A governing body must be given the opportunity to cure violations of the FOIA’s meeting provisions. Further, a willful and knowing violation of the FOIA could also be grounds for a claim that an elected city official was guilty of the criminal offense of “nonfeasance in office.”
Question 2: The burden of responding to and redacting lengthy FOIA requests has led several municipalities to contract with outside programs designed to assist in documenting, redacting, and responding to these requests. An example is a company called JustFOIA, but I am sure there are other examples. These companies store the responses to the FOIA requests for a period of time after the municipality has responded to the request. Are these responses, which are stored by an outside company, considered “kept” by the municipality for the purposes of responding to future FOIA requests? Does it change the answer if the municipality has the ability to determine how long the company stores the data? Example: John Doe requests all of the Mayor’s emails for a three-month period. Those emails are reviewed, redacted, and submitted to the outside company for distribution to the requestor. The FOIA request and all of the attached emails are then stored by that company for a period of two years. A year later, Jenny Smith makes a request for all of the Mayor’s emails about the city police department policies. The City only maintains emails on their server for a period of three months before they are permanently deleted. The City responds to Jenny with three months’ worth of emails on the topic requested. Is the City required to search the emails stored by the outside company that were kept because they were provided in the FOIA to John Doe to see if any are responsive to Jenny’s request? Are those emails considered “kept” by the municipality?
Brief Response: Yes. As explained in the opinion, the municipality must provide copies of, or arrange for reasonable access to, those records under the FOIA. Thus, in your example, the City must search the emails held by the company if they remain under the City’s administrative control, notwithstanding the City’s three-month retention policy.
Question: Does a part-time employee position as Park Event Coordinator with a municipality constitute a “municipal office” within the meaning of A.C.A. § 14-42-107(a)(1), such that a former council member is prohibited from accepting that position if it was created during or the emoluments of which have been increased during the time for which he or she has been elected?
Brief Response: In my opinion, the answer is likely “no.” Based on the facts provided, the position of a Park Event Coordinator is more properly characterized as municipal employment, rather than a “municipal office.” Accordingly, A.C.A. § 14-42-107(a)(1) would not prohibit a former council member from accepting the position merely because it was created during his or her term of office.
Question 1 (a): In the event a circuit judge decides to employ a secretary under the provisions of 16-13-219(b), would the position and the salary of each secretary need to be fixed by the quorum court of the county or counties involved in accordance with and as required by 16-13-219(b), 14-14-801(b)(6), and Amendment 55, Section 3?
Brief Response: The circuit court may create and fill the statutory position of secretary, but the quorum court is responsible for fixing the secretary’s salary at a “reasonable” level, absent a showing by the circuit court of an “absolute necessity” for a certain salary.
Question 1 (b): May the quorum court refuse to create such a position after request by a circuit judge? If so, on what bases?
Brief Response: No, the quorum court cannot refuse to create the position of secretary if requested by a circuit court under statute.
Question 1 (c): Many circuit judges employ trial court administrators, a more specialized and highly trained position, that exists as an employee of the State of Arkansas. Is the county-employee secretary position referenced in 16-13-219(b) made obsolete and supplanted by the more recent trial court administrator position that exists as state employee?
Brief Response: No. The positions of “secretary” and “trial court administrator” are two distinct circuit-court positions governed by separate statutes and subject to the authority of separate public bodies—one county and one state. Additionally, the General Assembly has not repealed and “supplanted” one position with the other.
Question 2: Are circuit court claims for expenses required to be budgeted, appropriated and paid in accordance with the county claims process pursuant to 14-23-101 et seq.?
Question 3: Are circuit court claims for juror per diem compensation or mileage required to be budgeted, appropriated, and paid in accordance with the county claims process pursuant to 14-23-101 et seq.?
Brief Response: To answer Questions 2 and 3 together, claims for circuit court expenses—including juror per diem compensation or mileage—must be budgeted, appropriated, and paid under the county claims process, although the authority of the quorum court and county judge in processing such claims is ministerial, not discretionary.
Question 4 (a): Would an order by a circuit judge for payment [of] any of the matters above under questions number 1, 2, or 3 be sufficient by itself to authorize payment without a sufficient appropriation by the quorum court and the approval of the claim by the county judge?
Brief Response: Only if the expenditure is necessary and essential for the court to operate. Absent a showing of absolute necessity, the circuit judge’s order is not sufficient to authorize payment.
Question 4 (b): May payment for the matters above be submitted for payment by the county clerk or approval by the county judge of a claim, without an appropriation by the quorum court?
Brief Response: No. Because a secretary’s salary “shall be fixed by the quorum court,” an appropriation by the quorum court is necessary before payment may be made.
Question 4 (c): May the county treasurer disburse county funds from the county general fund or any funds in the hands of the county treasurer in the absence of the approval of a claim? And an appropriation by the quorum court of a sufficient sum in the budget?
Brief Response: No. The county treasurer cannot disburse county funds from the county general fund or any other funds in the treasurer’s possession without approval of a claim or an appropriation by the quorum court.
Question 5: County budgets are to include line-item appropriations in accordance with the county financial management system.
(a) Is there an exception to the requirements of the financial management system and line-item budgets for the circuit court budgets which would authorize payments without appropriations by the quorum court?
Brief Response: There is no exception that would authorize such payments without an appropriation by the quorum court, unless the expenditure is necessary and essential for the court to operate.
(b) Are the various counties in the judicial district required to participate and appropriate funds pro rata share of the utilities and building/content insurance for the circuit courts?
Brief Response: No. The applicable statutes do not impose a pro rata sharing requirement for circuit court expenses.
(c) To the extent state funds are sufficient, is it necessary that attorney ad litem funding be budgeted, appropriated, and paid in accordance with the county claims process pursuant to 14-23-101 et seq.?
Brief Response: No. Because an attorney ad litem is paid from funds appropriated for that purpose to the Administrative Office of the Courts, such funding is not budgeted, appropriated, and paid through the county claims process.
